In this paper, we show that two variants of Stern's identification scheme [IEEE Transaction on Information Theory '96] are provably secure against concurrent attack under the assumptions on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. These assumptions are weaker than those for the previous lattice-based identification schemes of Micciancio and Vadhan [CRYPTO '03] and of Lyubashevsky [PKC '08]. We also construct efficient ad hoc anonymous identification schemes based on the lattice problems by modifying the variants.
Introduction
Many researchers have so far developed cryptographic schemes based on combinatorial problems related to knapsacks [20, 30] , codes [32, 34] , and lattices [1, 2, 12, 14] , due to the intractability of the underlying problems, the efficiency of primitive operations, and the threat of quantum computers to number-theoretic schemes [33] .
The cryptographic schemes based on combinatorial problems usually assume the average-case hardness of the underlying problem because they have to deal with randomly generated cryptographic instances such as keys, plaintexts, and ciphertexts. This implies security risk in such schemes since it is generally hard to show their average-case hardness. In fact, several attacks against such schemes were found in practical settings [31, 16, 4, 25] . The cryptographic schemes based only on the average-case hardness are more likely to be at risk of these kinds of attacks.
It is therefore significant to guarantee the security under the worst-case hardness. Ajtai [1] showed that the average-case hardness of some lattice problem is equivalent to its worst-case hardness. His seminal result opened the way to cryptographic schemes based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. Several lattice-based schemes were proposed such as public-key encryption schemes, e.g., by Ajtai and Dwork [2] , and hash functions [1, 11, 23] .
Among varieties of lattice-based cryptographic schemes, there are very few results on the identification (ID) schemes based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. For example, Micciancio and Vadhan proposed ID schemes based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems, such as the gap versions of the Shortest Vector Problem. These schemes are obtained from their statistical zero-knowledge protocol with efficient provers [24] . Recently, Lyubashevsky also constructed lattice-based ID schemes secure against active attack [17] . Unfortunately, the approximation factors of the underlying problems in their schemes are large for practical use as noted in [17, Sec. 5] since security parameters for ID schemes should be large in order to achieve the required hardness. Therefore, it is necessary to construct the schemes based on weaker assumptions, i.e., the assumptions on lattice problems with smaller approximation factors.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose two variants, which we call S + GL and S + C/IL , of Stern's ID scheme [34] . These variants are secure against concurrent attack 1 under the assumptions on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems, while
Stern's original scheme assumes the average-case hardness of certain decoding problem in coding theory and the existence of a collision-resistant hash function, and its security is only against passive attack. The underlying problems of S + GL and S + C/IL are the gap version of the Shortest Vector Problem with approximation factorÕ(n) (GapSVP 2Õ (n) ) and the Shortest Vector Problem for ideal lattices with approximation factorÕ(n) (Λ( f )-SVP
), respectively, whereÕ(g(n)) = O(g(n) poly log g(n)) for a function g in n, The assumptions are weaker than those for the previous lattice-based ID schemes [24, 17] . We stress that such weaker assumptions will take a step for practical use of lattice-based ID schemes.
Moreover, we show that our variants yield efficient ad hoc anonymous identification schemes (AID schemes). In an AID scheme, which introduced by Dodis, Kiayias, Nicolosi, and Shoup [7] , the protocol is done by two parties, a prover and verifier, but we implicitly suppose an ad hoc group. Given public keys of all members of the group to the verifier (and the prover), the goal is to convince the verifier that the prover belongs to the group, without being specified who the prover is of the group, if and only if the prover is an actual member of the group. We formally define a concurrent version of the security notion, the security against impersonation under concurrent chosen-group attack, and prove that our AID schemes satisfy this security notion. Our schemes are based on the worst-case hardness of GapSVP 2Õ (n) and Λ( f )-SVP
. To authors' best knowledge, this is the first non-trivial construction under the assumption of the worst-case hardness of lattice problems.
Main Ideas
In this section, we only discuss the ID scheme S + GL based on GapSVP. We first construct a string commitment scheme based on the lattice problem which will be used in ID schemes. Then we will describe the idea of the proof on concurrent security of the variant. Finally, we give a sketch of our construction method of an AID scheme.
Before giving the overview, we review the underlying problem GapSVP γ and the fundamental problem, the Small Integer Solution Problem (SIS q,m,β ), on which our variants are directly based. The informal definitions and the relationship of two problems are given as follows:
• SIS q,m,β : Given a random n-by-m matrix A whose elements are in Z q , the problem is finding an m-dimensional integral non-zero vector z such that Az ≡ 0 (mod q) and z 2 ≤ β.
• GapSVP 2 γ : Given an n-dimensional lattice L and a rational number d, the problem is outputting YES if there exists a non-zero vector v ∈ L such that v 2 ≤ d, or NO if for any non-zero vector v ∈ L v 2 > γd.
• ( [23] ) For suitable q and m, if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which solves SIS q,m,β on the average then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm which solves GapSVP 2Õ (βn 1/2 ) in the worst case.
As in Lyubashevsky's result [17] , we use the above relationship for our security reduction. Hence we mainly deals with SIS instead of GapSVP.
We simply obtain the lattice-based hash functions as in [11] : Choose a random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q . For any x ∈ {0, 1} m , a hash value is f A (x) := Ax mod q. A collision (x, x ) of the hash function f A implies a solution z = x − x of SIS q,m, √ m . Thus, the security of the hash functions is based on the worst-case hardness of GapSVP
.
String commitment schemes:
We construct a string commitment scheme from lattice-based hash functions. General constructions of string commitment schemes from collision-resistant hash functions were shown by Damgård, Pedersen, and Pfizmann [5] and Halevi and Micali [13] . Stern also constructed a string commitment scheme from collision-resistant hash functions in [34, Sec. III-A]: Let h be a hash function. Given a string s and a random string ρ, a commitment is h(ρ • (ρ ⊕ s)), where • and ⊕ denote the concatenation and XOR operators, respectively. However, its hiding property was not shown. We construct a string commitment scheme by a more direct and simpler way than the general one and Stern's one: Given s and ρ, a commitment is h(ρ • s), where h is a lattice-based hash function. The binding property simply follows from the collision-resistance property of h. We derive its hiding property from -regularity of h for some negligible function (see, e.g., [19, Sec. 4.1] ). As mentioned in the above, we have collision-resistant lattice-based hash functions based on the worst-case hardness of GapSVP, while Stern assumed the existence of collision-resistant hash function.
and maintains its own state. After interacting with many clones, the adversary tries impersonation. [17] (A) Table 1 : Comparisons among ID schemes and AID schemes. A secret key sk is x ∈ {0, 1} m . The factor n denotes the security parameter. We denote the Hamming weight of x by w H (x). Assume that the protocols are repeated t times in parallel for reducing errors. In the table for AID schemes, l denotes the number of the members in the group. Note that the parameters in ideal-lattice-based versions are almost same as those in general-lattice-based versions.
ID schemes (
Our ID scheme and its concurrent security: In Stern's scheme and our variant, a prover has a binary vector x with fixed Hamming weight as his/her secret key. We also feed to the prover and the verifier a matrix A as a system parameter and a vector y as the public key corresponding to x. The task of the prover is to convince the verifier that he/she knows a correct secret key x satisfying a relation Ax = y and x has a valid weight.
In Stern's protocol [34] , the prover computes three commitments and sends them to the verifier. The verifier sends a random challenge to the prover. The prover reveals two of three commitments corresponding to the challenge. He constructed the knowledge extractor which computes a collision of a hash function in a string commitment scheme or a secret key corresponding to the target public key if a passive adversary responds correctly to any challenges after sending commitments.
One of standard strategies to achieve concurrent security is to prove that a public key corresponds to multiple secret keys and that the protocol is witness indistinguishable (WI) [8] and proof-of-knowledge: The reduction algorithm generates sk and pk and runs the adversary on pk by simulating the prover with sk. Using the knowledge extractor of the protocol, the algorithm obtains another sk corresponding to pk with probability at least 1/2 since the protocol is WI. The algorithm then solves the underlying problem by using pk, sk, and sk .
In our reduction, when the algorithm is given A, it generates a secret key x and a public key y = Ax, and feeds A and y to the adversary. Note that the algorithm can simulate the prover with A and x that the adversary concurrently accesses. Using the knowledge extractor for the adversary in Stern's proof, the algorithm obtains a collision of a string commitment scheme or a secret key x such that x x and Ax = y, differently from the general strategy. In the former case, the algorithm outputs the collision (s, s ) of a hash function h A in the string commitment scheme. Thus, the solution for SIS is obtained by z = s − s . In the latter case, the condition x x will be satisfied with probability at least 1/2 by witness indistinguishability of Stern's protocol. Thus, the algorithm has the solution z = x − x for SIS. The 2 norm of both solutions is at most √ m =Õ(n 1/2 ). From the relationship between SIS and GapSVP the assumption is the worst-case hardness of GapSVP
AID schemes: Our construction for AID schemes also has the following structure: Each of l members in the ad hoc group has a vector x i (i = 1, . . . , l). Then, the common inputs of the scheme are a system parameter A and a set of public keys y 1 , . . . , y l of the members, which satisfy y i = Ax i (i = 1, . . . , l). We can show that, by Stern's protocol, the prover can anonymously convince the verifier that the prover knows x i corresponding to one of y 1 , . . . , y l , since he/she knows a new vector x such that [A y 1 . . . y l ]x = 0. (This idea is due to Wu, Chen, Wang, and Wang [35] , who presented an AID scheme from certain combinatorial problem.) Additionally, we force the prover to prove that the positions of +1 and −1 in x are proper by modifying Stern's protocol. We succeed to give security proof for the scheme, while Wu et al. gave no formal proof on the security of their scheme.
Comparison with Other Lattice-based Schemes
ID schemes: In [24] , Micciancio and Vadhan proposed a statistical zero-knowledge and proof-of-knowledge protocol for GapSVP. Combining it with lattice-based hash functions, we obtain an ID scheme which is secure against passive attack based on SIS q,m,Õ(n) , which can be reduced from GapSVP 2Õ (n 1.5 ) . In the scheme, the prover and the verifier are given a matrix A as a common input, and the prover has a binary vector x as secret information. The task of the prover is to convince the verifier that he/she knows x satisfying the relations that Ax = 0 and x is relatively short. It seems difficult to directly simulate the prover since a simulator has to prepare a dummy short vector x satisfying Ax = 0, which is the task of SIS itself. Thus, we cannot straightforwardly prove the concurrent security for their ID scheme.
By a simple modification, we can construct a concurrently secure ID scheme (MV + GL for short) based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems by Micciancio and Vadhan's ID scheme as noted in [24, Sec. 5] . In particular, applying techniques of De Santis, Di Crescenzo, Persiano, and Yung [6] and of Feige and Shamir [8] , a modification of the ID scheme can be proven to have concurrent security 2 based on the same problem as that in the original scheme.
Recently, Lyubashevsky proposed new concurrently secure ID schemes based on lattice problems [17] ; we call it L GL for short. In his protocol, the prover proves, given A and y, he/she has x ∈ {0, 1} m such that Ax = y. Using an active adversary, his knowledge extractor obtains another vector x such that Ax = y and the length of x is at most O(m 1.5 ) =Õ(n 1.5 ). Thus, in the L GL scheme, the underlying problem is SIS q,m,Õ(n 1.5 ) , which can be reduced from GapSVP 2Õ (n 2 )
. As mentioned in the previous section, the assumption of S + GL is the worst-case hardness of GapSVP
, which is weaker than those of MV + GL and L GL . This improvement is obtained by the condition that the knowledge extractor outputs another secret key x whose length is at most √ m =Õ( √ n). Our schemes has 1-sided error (perfect completeness and soundness error), while L GL has 2-sided error (completeness and soundness errors). As a summary, see Table 1 .
AID schemes: By taking OR of l statements [6] , we can straightforwardly obtain MV + GL -based and L GL -based AID schemes, whose security are based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. We feed only pk 1 , . . . , pk l as the common inputs to the prover and the verifier. In this case, the prover convinces the verifier that he/she has a secret key corresponding to one of public keys, pk i .
However, each of these simple modifications requires a large overhead cost involving the size of the ad hoc group. Let l be the number of the members of the group and n the security parameter. The protocol is run in t times in parallel to reduce the errors. The communication costs of the MV + GL -based and L GL -based schemes are tl ·Õ(n). The size of a set of the public keys is l ·Õ(n 2 ) andÕ(n 2 ) + l ·Õ(n) in the modified versions of MV + GL and L GL , respectively.
On AID schemes, the L GL -based and our schemes require many vectors proportional to the size of the group, while the MV + GL -based scheme requires many matrices proportional to the size of the group (see Table 1 ). Additionally, the communication cost of our schemes is t ·Õ(n + l), while those in the MV + GL -based and L GL -based schemes are tl ·Õ(n). This shows the advantage of our scheme on the efficiency.
Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review basic notations and notions, and the cryptographic schemes we consider. (The formal definition of AID schemes is in Appendix A.1.) In Section 3, we review lattice-based hash functions and give a commitment scheme based on the lattice-based hash functions for our ID and AID schemes. In Section 4, we construct the ID scheme by combining the framework of Stern's scheme with our string commitment scheme. We present the AID scheme in Section 5.
In this paper, due to lack of space, we only describe the schemes based on GapSVP since the construction on Λ( f )-SVP follows from a similar strategy to that on GapSVP. We discuss the constructions on Λ( f )-SVP in the full paper.
Preliminaries
Basic notions and notations: We denote by n the security parameter of cryptographic schemes throughout this paper, which corresponds to the rank of the underlying lattice problems. We say that a problem is hard in the worst case if there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm solves the problem in the worst case with non-negligible probability. We sometimes useÕ(g(n)) for any function g in n as O(g(n)·polylog(g(n))). We assume that all random variables are independent and uniform. For a positive integer n, let [n] denote a set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
For any p ≥ 1, the p norm of a vector
For ease of notation, we define x := x 2 . The ∞ norm is defined as We omit the definitions of zero-knowledge arguments and witness-indistinguishable protocols. For formal definitions, see textbooks, e.g., by Goldreich [10] .
Hash functions:
We briefly review the definition of collision-resistant hash function family. Let 
String commitment schemes:
We consider a string commitment scheme in the trusted setup model. The trusted setup model is often required to construct practically efficient cryptographic schemes such as non-interactive string commitment schemes. In this model, we assume that a trusted party T honestly sets up a system parameter for the sender and the receiver.
First T distributes the index k of a commitment function to the sender and the receiver. Both parties then share a common function Com k by a given k. The scheme runs in two phase, called committing and revealing phases. In the committing phase, the sender commits his/her decision, say a string s, to a commitment string c = Com k (s; ρ) with a random string ρ and sends c to the receiver. In the revealing phase, the sender gives the receiver the decision s and the random string ρ. The receiver verifies the validity of c by computing Com k (s; ρ).
We require two security notions of the string commitment schemes, statistically-hiding and computationallybinding properties. Intuitively, we say that the commitment scheme is statistically hiding, if any computationally unbounded adversarial receiver cannot distinguish two commitment strings generated from two distinct strings. Also, it is computationally binding, if any polynomial-time adversarial sender cannot change the committed string after sending the commitment. See, e.g., [13] for the formal definition.
Canonical identification schemes:
Let SI = (SetUp, KG, P, V) be an identification scheme, where SetUp is the setup algorithm which on input 1 n outputs param, KG is the key-generation algorithm which on input param outputs (pk, sk), P is the prover algorithm taking input sk, V is the verifier algorithm taking inputs param and pk. We say SI is a canonical identification scheme if it is a public-coin 3-move protocol.
We are interested in concurrent attack, which is stronger than active and passive attack. We employ the definition of concurrent security in [3] . In concurrent attack, the adversary will play the role of a cheating verifier prior to impersonation and can interact many different prover clones concurrently. Each clone has the same secret key, but has independent random coins and maintains its own state. We say SI is secure against impersonation under concurrent attack, if any polynomial-time adversary cannot, given a random public key of a legitimate prover, impersonate the legitimate prover. For the formal definition, see [3] .
Ad hoc anonymous identification schemes: An AID scheme allows a user to anonymously prove his/her membership in a group if and only if the user is an actual member of the group, where the group is formed in an ad hoc fashion without help of the group manager. We then assume that every user registers his/her public key to the public key infrastructure.
We define the algorithms in AID schemes. An AID scheme is four tuple AID = (SetUp, Reg, P, V), where SetUp is the setup algorithm which on input 1 n outputs param, Reg is the key generation and registration algorithm which on input param outputs (pk, sk), P is the prover algorithm taking inputs param, a set of public keys R = (pk 1 , . . . , pk l ), and one of the secret keys sk i such that pk i ∈ R, and V is the verifier algorithm taking inputs param and R. For more formal definition, see [7] .
There are two goals for security of AID schemes: Security against impersonation and anonymity. Dodis et al. formally defined security against impersonation under passive attack. They mentioned the definition of security against impersonation under concurrent attack. However, they did not give the formal definition (see [7, Sec. 3.2] ). Thus, we define the security notion with respect to concurrent attack. In the setting of chosen-group attack, the adversary could force the prover to prove the membership in an arbitrary group if the prover is indeed a member of the group. Additionally, concurrent attack allows the cheating verifier to interact with the clones of any provers. Also, they allow the cheating prover to interact with the clones of provers, but prohibit it from interacting with the target provers. We say AID is secure against impersonation under concurrent chosen-group attack, if any polynomial-time adversary cannot impersonate the legitimate prover in the above settings.
The security notion, anonymity against full key exposure, captures the property that an adversary cannot distinguish two transcripts even if the adversary has the secret keys of all the members. We say AID is anonymous against full key exposure if any polynomial-time adversary cannot distinguish two provers with a common set of public keys even though the adversary generates all keys of the set. The formal definitions of two notions are in the full paper.
Main Tools
In this section, we review main tools, lattices, lattice problems, and lattice-based hash functions, and construct string commitment schemes.
Lattices and lattice problems:
We first review fundamental notions of lattices, well-known lattice problems, and a related problem.
An
The sequence of vectors b 1 , . . . , b n is called a basis of the lattice L and denoted by B. For more details on lattices, see the textbook by Micciancio and Goldwasser [22] .
We give the definitions of well-known lattice problems, the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP p ) and its approximation version (SVP We also define the Small Integer Solution problem SIS (in the p norm), which is often considered in the context of average-case/worst-case connections and a source of lattice-based hash functions as we see later. [23] ). For a fixed integer q and a real β, given a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , the problem is finding a non-zero integer vector z ∈ Z m such that Az ≡ 0 (mod q) and z p ≤ β.
The relation between SIS and GapSVP is reviewed in the next paragraph.
Lattice-based hash functions:
We review the lattice-based hash functions. For a prime q = q(n) = n O (1) and an integer m = m(n) > n log q(n), we define a family of hash functions,
where f A (x) = Ax mod q. Originally, Ajtai [1] showed that the worst-case hardness of GapSVP 2 γ for some polynomial γ(n) is reduced to the average-case hardness of SIS 2 q,m,n for suitable q(n) and m(n). It is known that H(q, m) is indeed collision resistant for suitably chosen q and m by Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Halevi [11] . They observed that finding a collision (x, x ) for f A ∈ H(q, m) implies finding a short non-zero vector z = x − x such that z ≤ √ m and Az ≡ 0 (mod q), i.e., solving SIS is hard in the worst case [23] . There were another reductions from the gap version of the covering radius problem GapCRP γ , the shortest independent vector problem SIVP γ , and the guaranteed distance decoding problem GDD γ by adjusting the parameters [23] . It is worth that we note the results following the above results: Peikert [27] showed the reductions from the same problems in any p norms for p ≥ 2. Recent paper [9, Sec. 9] by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan showed that the modulus q in SIS can beÕ(n).
A string commitment scheme: General constructions of statistically-hiding and computationally-binding string commitment schemes are known from a family of collision-resistant hash functions [5, 13] . Their constructions used universal hash functions for the statistically-hiding property.
Here, we give a more direct and simpler construction from the lattice-based hash functions without the universal hash functions. The input of the commitment function is an m-bit vector x obtained by concatenating a random string ρ = (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ m/2 ) and a message string s = (s 1 , . . . , s m/2 ), i.e., x = ρ • s. We then define the commitment function on inputs s and ρ as Before the proof, we review a definition of statistical distances: Given two probability density functions φ 1 and φ 2 on a finite set S , we define the statistical distance between them as ∆(φ 1 , φ 2 ) := 1 2
Proof. The computationally-binding property immediately follows from the collision-resistant property. We now show the statistically-hiding property.
Let
The following claim in [29] says that a random subset sum of a i is statistically close to the uniform distribution for almost all choices of a i . Let l be n log q and let t : Z n q → {0, 1} l be some one-to-one function that we compute t and t −1 efficiently. Let pad : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * be padding function for the Merkle-Damgård construction. Applying the Merkle-Damgård construction to f C , we obtain new hash function h C : {0, 1} * → Z n q . The precise definitions is as follows:
Claim 3.5 ([29]). Let G be some finite Abelian group and let l be some integer. For any l elements g
Hash function h C :
1. On input s, obtain a padded message S ← pad(s)
2. Chop it into (S 0 , . . . , S k ), where S i ∈ {0, 1} r−l 3. Let H 0 = 0 (more generally, some fixed IV can be used)
Output H k+1
Our new commitment scheme is defined as follows: for s ∈ {0, 1} * and ρ ∈ {0, 1} r , Proof. Let us assume that we obtain a collision (s, ρ), (s,ρ) ∈ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} r for Com A . By the assumption, we have
If ρ =ρ, we have s s and h C (s) = h C (s). Using the reduction for the Merkle-Damgård construction (see e.g., [15, Thm. 4 .14]), we obtain u ũ ∈ {0, 1} r such that f C (u) = f C (ũ). Thus, we have a collision u • ρ,ũ • ρ ∈ {0, 1} 2r for f A . Next, we assume that ρ ρ. Let S andS be padded messages of s ands, respectively. Assume that S andS are chopped into (S 0 , . . . , S k ) and (S 0 , . . . ,S k ), respectively. Let H k andH k be inner hash values for s ands in the algorithm, respectively. By the definition of H k andH k , we obtain
Combining the above equations with the assumption, we obtain
So, we have a collision t(H
We use this commitment scheme in the rest of the paper. We often abuse the notation of Com A . 
An Identification Scheme
Our variant S + GL is obtained by replacing the string commitment scheme in Stern's ID scheme [34] with our latticebased one. Stern's protocol deals with the decoding problem on binary codewords called the Syndrome Decoding Problem 3 . He also proposed that an analogous scheme in Z q , where q is extremely small (typically 3, 5, or 7) [34, Sec. VI]. We adjust this parameter to connect his framework to our assumptions of the lattice problems.
We now describe the protocol S + GL below. Obviously, it has perfect completeness, and at most 2/3 soundness error. By parallelizing each step of this protocol in t = ω(log n) times, the soundness error becomes negligibly small. To simplify the notations, we write Com instead of Com A and we do not write random strings in Com explicitly.
SetUp:
The setup algorithm, on input 1 n , outputs a random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q .
KG:
The key-generation algorithm, on input A, chooses a random vector x ∈ B(m, m/2) and computes y := Ax mod q. It outputs (pk, sk) = (y, x).
P, V:
The common inputs are A and y. The prover's auxiliary input is x. They interact as follows:
Step P1: Choose a random permutation π over [m] and a random vector r ∈ Z m q and send commitments c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 computed as
• c 1 = Com(π, Ar),
• c 2 = Com(π(r)),
• c 3 = Com(π(x + r)).
Step V1 Send a random challenge Ch ∈ {1, 2, 3} to P.
Step P2
• If Ch = 1, reveal c 2 and c 3 . So, send s = π(x) and t = π(r).
• If Ch = 2, reveal c 1 and c 3 . Send φ = π and u = x + r.
• If Ch = 3, reveal c 1 and c 2 . Send ψ = π and v = r.
Step V2
• If Ch = 1, check that c 2 = Com(t), c 3 = Com(s + t), and s ∈ B(m, m/2).
• If Ch = 2, check that c 1 = Com(φ, Au − y) and c 3 = Com(φ(u)).
• If Ch = 3, check that c 1 = Com(ψ, Av) and c 2 = Com(ψ(v)).
Output Dec = 1 if all checks are passed, otherwise output Dec = 0.
Statistical Zero-Knowledge Property
The proof of zero-knowledge property of the original protocol is in [34, Thm. 4] . Stern left completion of the proof as the problem for reader. Thus, we give the whole proof that Stern's protocol is statistically zero knowledge when Com is a statistically-hiding and computationally-binding string commitment scheme.
Theorem 4.1. The protocol is statistically zero knowledge when Com is a statistically-hiding and computationally-binding string commitment scheme.
Proof. Following the definition, we construct a simulator S which on input A and y and given oracle access to a cheating verifier CV, outputs a simulated transcript. A real transcript between P and CV on input A and y is denoted by P, CV (A, y). First, S chooses a random valuec from {1, 2, 3} which is a prediction what value the cheating verifier CV will not choose. Next, it chooses a random tape of CV, denoted by r . We remark that, by the assumption on the commitment, the distributions of a challenge from CV in the real interaction and that in the simulation are statistically close. It sends them to CV. Since the commitment scheme is statistically hiding, the distribution of a challenge from CV is statistically close to the real distribution. Receiving a challenge Ch from CV, the simulator S computes a transcript as follows:
• If Ch = 1, S outputs ⊥ and halts.
• If Ch = 2, it outputs (r ; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 2, (π , x + r , ρ 1 , ρ 3 ) ).
• If Ch = 3, it outputs (r ; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 3, (π , r , ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) ).
We analyze the case Ch = 2. In this case, we obtain that P, CV (A, y) = (r; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 2, (π, x + r, ρ 1 , ρ 3 ) , S(A, y) = (r ; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 2, (π , x + r , ρ 1 , ρ 3 )).
Assume that (π , r , ρ 1 , ρ 3 ) = (π, r + x − x , ρ 1 , ρ 3 ). By this equation, we have that c 1 = c 1 , c 3 = c 3 , and the responses from the simulator equal to the responses from the prover. Since the commitment is statistically hiding, we have the distributions of c 2 and c 2 are statistically close. Thus, we conclude that the both distributions of the simulated transcript and the real transcript are statistically close.
It is straightforward to show it in the case Ch = 3 by using the equation (π , r ) = (π, r). Thus, we omit this part from the proof. It sends them to CV. Receiving a challenge Ch, the simulator computes a transcript as follows: then S outputs (r ; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 1, (π (x ), π (r ), ρ 2 , ρ 3 ) ).
• If Ch = 2, then it outputs ⊥ and halts.
• If Ch = 3, then it outputs (r ; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 3, (π , r , ρ 1 , ρ 2 ) ).
We analyze the case Ch = 1. In this case, we have that
Let χ be a permutation over [m] such that χ(x ) = x. In this case, we set (π , r , ρ 2 , ρ 3 )
. By this equation, we have c 2 = c 2 , c 3 = c 3 , and the responses from the simulator equal to the responses from the prover. Since the commitment scheme is statistically hiding, the distributions of the real transcript and the output of the simulator are statistically close.
We omit the proof of the case Ch = 3, since it is trivial. It sends them to CV.
• If Ch = 1, then S outputs (r ; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 1, (π(x ), π(r), ρ 2 , ρ 3 ).
• If Ch = 2, then it outputs (r ; (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ), 2, (π, x + r )).
• If Ch = 3, it outputs ⊥ and halts.
In the case Ch = 1, we consider the equation (π , r , ρ 2 , ρ 3 ) = (χ −1 •π, χ(r), ρ 2 , ρ 3 ). The remaining part of proof is the same as that in the casec = 2 and Ch = 1. In the case Ch = 2, we let (π , r , ρ 1 , ρ 3 ) = (π, r + x − x , ρ 1 , ρ 3 ). The remaining part of proof is the same as that in the casec = 1 and Ch = 2.
The probability that the simulator S outputs ⊥ is at most 1/3 + (n) ≤ 1/2 where is some negligible function. Additionally, by the above arguments, the distribution of the output of S conditioned on it is not ⊥ is statistically close to the distribution of the real transcript. Therefore, we have constructed the simulator and completed the proof.
Since the protocol is statistically zero knowledge for t = 1, it has a witness-indistinguishable property. Witness-indistinguishable property is closed under the parallel composition [8] . Thus, the above protocol is witness indistinguishable for t = ω(log n) if a statistically-hiding string commitment scheme is used.
Security of the Protocol
We show the theorem of the security on our ID protocol, which concerns impersonation under concurrent attack. Before the proof of security, we need to mention the following trivial lemma. on the average from an impersonator I = (CV, CP) which succeeds impersonation under concurrent attack with non-negligible probability .
For the clarity, we write the transcript of interaction by (Cmt, Ch, Rsp, Dec). Since the protocol is parallelized, each Cmt, Ch, and Rsp is an ordered list which contains t elements. For example, Cmt = (Cmt 1 , . . . , Cmt t ).
Given A, A chooses a random secret key x ∈ B(m, m/2) and computes y = Ax. Using the secret key, it can simulate the prover oracle perfectly. A runs CV on input (A, y) and obtains a state for CP. A feeds the state to CP and acts as a legitimate verifier. Receiving commitments Cmt, A chooses three challenges Ch (1) , Ch (2) , and Ch (3) from {1, 2, 3} t uniformly at random. Rewinding with three challenges, A obtains three transcripts (Cmt,
as the results of the interactions. By the Heavy Row Lemma [26] , the probability that all Dec (i) are 1 is at least ( /2) 3 . Meanwhile, we have
t by a simple calculation. Thus the probability that A has three transcripts (Cmt,
j } = {1, 2, 3} for some j ∈ [t] is at least ( /2) 3 − (7/9) t , which is non-negligible since is non-negligible and t = ω(log n).
We next show how A obtains a secret key or finds a collision of the hash functions in the string commitment scheme by using three good transcripts. Assume that A has three transcripts (Cmt (i) , (3) , Dec (i) = 1 for all i, and {Ch
j } = {1, 2, 3} for some j ∈ [t]. Without loss of generality, we assume that Ch
j as in Step V2. We have following equations (We omit j for simplification):
2 ),
3 ), s ∈ B(m, m/2). We now have to show that x x with probability at least 1/2. By Lemma 4.3, there must be another secret key x corresponding to y with overwhelming probability. Recall that the protocol is statistically witness indistinguishable. Hence, I's view is independent of A's choice of x with overwhelming probability. Thus we have x x with probability at least 1/2. In this case A outputs z = x − x and solves SIS q,m, √ m .
If there exists a distinct pair of arguments of Com
We note that the above proof is extended into multi-user settings as in the proof of Lyubashevsky [17] .
An Ad Hoc Anonymous Identification Scheme
We next construct our AID scheme based on GapSVP. First, we sketch a basic idea for our construction: Let A be a system parameter. Each user has a secret key x i ∈ B(m, w) and a public key y i = Ax i . In the AID scheme, a group is specified by a set of public keys (y 1 , . . . , y l ) of the members. Let e i,l denote an l-dimensional vector t (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) whose i-th element is 1. The prover in the group, who has a secret key x i , wants convinces the verifier that he/she knows that x := x i • −e i,l such that [A y 1 . . . y l ]x = 0 and x i ∈ B(m, m/2). Changing the parameters and using Stern's protocol, the prover can convinces the verifier that he/she has x such that [A y 1 . . . y l ]x = 0, the numbers of +1 in x is m/2, and the numbers of −1 in x is 1. Additionally, we force the prover to prove that x is in the form x = x i • −e i,l . To do so, we divide a permutation π in Step P1 into two permutations.
Let π h be a permutation over [m] and π t be a permutation over [l] . For a permutation π over [m + l], we denote
For any π h and π t , we have (π h π t )
We here construct an AID scheme based on GapSVP. Similarly to the ID scheme in Section 4, the protocol is repeated t = ω(log n) times in parallel to achieve exponentially small soundness error. As in the previous section, we hide randomness in Com A . Step P1: Choose random permutations π h over [m] and π t over [l] . Let π = π h π t . Choose a random vector r ∈ Z m+l q . Send commitments c 1 , c 2 , and c 3 as
SetUp: Same as
• If Ch = 1, reveal c 2 and c 3 . Send s = π(x) and t = π(r).
• If Ch = 2, reveal c 1 and c 2 . Send φ h = π h , φ t = π t , and u = x + r.
• If Ch = 3, reveal c 1 and c 3 . Send ψ h = π h , ψ t = π t , and v = r.
• If Ch = 1, check that c 2 = Com(t), c 3 = Com(s + t), and s is in the form s h • −e j,l for some j and s h ∈ B(m, m/2).
The security of the above protocol is stated as follows. We omit the proof, since it is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2. The statistical anonymity of the above scheme follows from witness indistinguishability of the protocol.
The algorithm A, given input A, feeds A to the impersonator I. In the experiment, the impersonator I will call I, C, and P. If I calls I with input i, then A chooses x i at random, computes y i := Ax i , and returns y i to I. A can simulate the oracles C and P, since A has the secret key x i corresponding to the public key y i .
At the end of the experiment, I will impersonate as a group which is specified by the set of the public keys R = (y 1 , . . . , y l ). Rewinding I three times, A obtains three good transcripts as in the previous proof.
We next show how A obtains a secret key or finding a collision of the hash functions in the string commitment scheme by using three good transcripts. Assume that A has three transcripts (Cmt (i) , (3) , Dec (i) = 1 for all i, and {Ch
j as in Step V2. From the above argument, we have four equations as follows (We omit j for simplification):
3 ), s = s h • −e k,l for some k and s h ∈ B(m, m/2).
If there exists a distinct pair of arguments of Com A , A obtains a collision for A and solves SIS q,m, √ m . Let us assume that there exist no distinct pairs. Let π be an inverse permutation of φ h φ t . From the first equation, we obtain the equation π −1 = φ h φ t = ψ h ψ t . Combining with the third equation, we have u = π(s + t). Thus, we have A v = A (π(s) + π(t)). From the second equation, v = π(t). Hence, we obtain A · π(s) = 0. We have π = π h π t for some permutations π h and π t over [m] and [l] respectively, since π is inverse of φ h φ t . Thus, we have A (π h (s h ) • π t (−e k.l )) = 0. That is y π t (k) = Aπ h (s h ). By using same argument in the previous proof, we have that π h (s h ) x π t (k) with probability at least 1/2. So, A outputs z = x π t (k) − π h (s h ) as a solution for SIS q,m, √ m .
C Constructions from the Cyclic/Ideal Lattice Based Hash Functions
In this section, we construct the ID scheme and the AID scheme based on the cyclic/ideal lattice based hash functions. We basically follow the notations of [18] .
C.1 The Cyclic/Ideal Lattice Based Hash Functions
Several families of lattice-based hash functions are known to have small description sizes such as [21, 28, 18] . Originally, Micciancio [21] gave the compact version of the lattice-based hash functions and proved the onewayness of the version. After that, Peikert and Rosen [28] and Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [18] proposed the modified versions of the version of Micciancio and showed their collision-resistance property, independently. We employ the notions, the notations, the definitions, and the results in Lyubashevsky and Micciancio [18] , since its generality of the descriptions.
Let f ∈ Z[x] be a monic and irreducible polynomial of degree n. Consider the quotient ring Z[x]/ f . We use the standard set of representatives {(g mod f ) : g ∈ Z[x]}. In this section we identify a polynomial a(x) = a 0 + a 1 x + · · · + a n−1 x n−1 ∈ Z[x]/ f with an n-dimensional integer vector a = t (a 0 , . . . , a n−1 ). We define a norm with respect to f as follows: For g ∈ Z[x], g + f f = (g mod f ) ∞ . We write g f instead of g + f f .
We note that any ideal I ⊆ Z[x]/ f defines the corresponding n-dimensional integer lattice L(I) ⊆ Z n . Notice that a class of the lattices representable in this way is contained in a general class of all integer lattices L(B) ⊆ Z n . If a given lattice in SVP p is restricted in a class Λ of lattices, we denote by Λ-SVP p the problem over such restricted lattices in Λ. We also denote by Λ( f ) the set of lattices that are isomorphic to ideals of Z[x]/ f . See [18] for the details. We here deal with Λ( f )-SVP ∞ γ , i.e., SVP with approximation factor γ in the ∞ norm whose input lattices are restricted in Λ( f ).
Lyubashevsky and Micciancio constructed a family of collision-resistant hash functions based on the worstcase hardness of Λ( f )-SVP for suitable f .
We review what f is suitable for the construction of Lyubashevsky and Micciancio. The property of f is defined as that the ring norm g f is not much bigger than g ∞ for any polynomial g. Formally, they captured this property as the expansion factor of f :
For example, a simple calculation shows that EF(x n ± 1, k) ≤ k and EF(x n−1 + x n−2 + · · · + 1, k) ≤ 2k. We say a polynomial f is suitable if f is a monic and irreducible in Z[x] and there is a constant c such that EF( f, k) ≤ ck for any natural number k. The security of the hash functions is based on the worst-case hardness of Λ( f )-SVP for a suitable polynomial f . See [18] for more details. They employed a family of polynomials such as x n + 1 and We now describe a simple version of a family of hash functions given in [18] . Lyubashevsky and Micciancio showed the following theorem in [18] .
